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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 













LONG BEACH TOWNSHIP; 
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS OF LONG BEACH TOWNSHIP; 
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY OF LONG BEACH TOWNSHIP; 
LONG BEACH TOWNSHIP BEACH PATROL; 
LONG BEACH TOWNSHIP SPRAY BEACH PATROL; 
JOHN DOES, 1 THROUGH 5, JOINTLY, 
SEVERALLY AND IN THE ALTERNATIVE; 
DONALD MEYERS; JON CAMP; SEAN ADAMS; 








GARY S. PETRILLO, Individually, 
LOIS PETRILLO, Conservator of the Estate 
and person of Gary S. Petrillo, and individually, 
JILL S. PETRILLO, 
          Appellants 
v. 
 
BOROUGH OF SURF CITY, 
A Municipality of the State of New Jersey, 
LEONARD T. CONNOR, Mayor, 
JOHN DOES "A,B,C," JANE DOES "D,E,F," 
Elected and Appointed Officials of the 
Borough of Surf City, these being fictitious names, 
their actual names not known to the plaintiffs, 
MARK OCCHIPINTI, PATRICIA D'AMBROSIO, FIN LEALIN, 
JOHN DOES "G,H,I," Lifeguards, JANE DOES "J,K,L," 
Lifeguards employed by the Borough of Surf City, 
and correct name of Lealin and the actual names 
of the fictitious John Does G,H,I and Jane Does J,K,L, 
not being known to the plaintiffs at this time, 
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DEPARTMENT OF RECREATION OF SURF CITY, 
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SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
 In these diversity suits, plaintiffs Roman Kowalsky and 
Gary Petrillo appeal the district court's grants of summary 
judgment on their claims for damages arising from tragic injuries 
suffered while they were swimming at New Jersey beaches.0 Because 
we agree with the district court that under the New Jersey Tort 
Claims Act, defendants, municipal entities and municipal 
employees, are entitled to immunity from liability as a matter of 
law, we will affirm. 
I. 
A. 
 During mid-afternoon on September 2, 1990, Roman 
Kowalsky entered the ocean to go swimming at Spray Beach in Long 
Beach Township, New Jersey, an area protected at the time by 
municipal lifeguards.  After swimming and "bodysurfing" in the 
water for twenty minutes, he decided to return to the beach. 
"Bodysurfing" to shore, he was caught between two waves and 
driven into the sand.0  Although a lifeguard quickly reached 
Kowalsky and summoned an ambulance, he had already suffered a 
broken neck, resulting in permanent paralysis below the waist. 
                     
01.  These cases were brought separately but decided by the same 
district court, and were consolidated on appeal. 
0Kowalsky explained: "[a]s I rode the wave in, as I got towards 
the beach another wave was receding.  Between that wave and the 
wave on top of me, it bent me over and pile d[r]ived my head into 
the beach."  Brief for Appellant at 7. 
5 
 Although Kowalsky said that when he arrived at the 
beach the surf looked normal and no different from other visits, 
he contends the water conditions were hazardous, resulting from 
Hurricane Gustav, 1000-1200 miles offshore.  He maintains that 
because of the hurricane, an unusually high number of rescues 
occurred over that Labor Day weekend.  Both the lifeguard on duty 
and the beach supervisor testified the weather was sunny and dry, 
the surf normal for that time of year and there was no reason to 
close the beach or prohibit bodysurfing. 
 Kowalsky's amended complaint alleged that defendants, 
various municipal entities and certain municipal employees: (1) 
negligently supervised the beach; (2) failed to warn of a 
dangerous condition; and (3) failed to properly train beach 
patrol personnel.  Defendants denied negligence and asserted 
immunity under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act.  N.J. Stat. Ann. 
§59:1-1 et seq. (West 1992 & 1995 Supp.).  The district court 
granted summary judgment to all defendants.0 
B. 
 On a sunny afternoon on September 1, 1990, Gary 
Petrillo was swimming and "bodysurfing" in the ocean at the 12-
14th Street Beach in Surf City, New Jersey.  After forty minutes 
                     
03.  Under Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
summary judgment may be granted when the pleadings, answers and 
supporting material show there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.  See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 
(1986).  Our review of a district court's grant of summary 
judgment is plenary.  See Lundy v. Adamar of New Jersey, Inc., 34 
F.3d 1173, 1177 (3d Cir. 1994). 
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he became cold and decided to head ashore.  While hip-deep in the 
water he was struck from behind by a wave that knocked him face 
first into the sand.  Realizing he could not move, he remained 
lying on his back in the water.  The attending lifeguard called 
for assistance and Petrillo was taken by ambulance and helicopter 
to a hospital.  As a result of his injury Petrillo remains 
paralyzed from the neck down and has lost the power of speech.   
 Petrillo contends that Hurricane Gustav, 1000-1200 
miles offshore, had created turbulent water along the New Jersey 
coast, resulting in hazardous conditions.  He maintains that 
despite knowing the danger, the beach patrol failed to warn the 
swimmers or close the beaches.  Petrillo's complaint alleged that 
his accident was caused "jointly, severally or in the alternative 
by the negligence, recklessness and carelessness" of defendants, 
various municipal entities and employees of these entities.  His 
mother, Lois Petrillo, and his sister, Jill Petrillo, alleged 
emotional distress stemming from the accident.  Defendants denied 
negligence and asserted immunity under the New Jersey Tort Claims 
Act.  The district court granted summary judgment to all 
defendants. 
II. 
 The central issue presented by these appeals is the 
nature and scope of immunity conferred upon defendant municipal 
entities and municipal employees by New Jersey's Tort Claims Act, 
which governs damage claims against public entities and public 
employees.  In particular dispute is N.J.S.A. 59:4-8, which 
confers immunity from liability for injuries caused by a 
7 
condition of unimproved public property.  Defendants assert they 
are entitled to immunity under this provision.  Kowalsky and 
Petrillo maintain the public property at issue is "improved," 
making N.J.S.A. 59:4-8 immunity inapplicable.  In the 
alternative, they contend that N.J.S.A. 59:4-8 does not bar their 
claims for negligent supervision and failure to warn. 
 In adjudicating a case under state law, we must predict 
how the highest court of that state would decide the relevant 
legal issues.  See Packard v. Provident Nat'l Bank, 994 F.2d 
1039, 1049 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 440 (1993).  Our 
review of the district court's determination of state law is de 
novo.  Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 231 (1991); 
see also Acierno v. Cloutier, 40 F.3d 597, 609-10 (3d Cir. 1994) 
(in banc).  Consequently, we turn to the Tort Claims Act as well 
as New Jersey case law to evaluate the claims raised in this 
appeal. 
III. 
 The New Jersey Tort Claims Act sets forth the 
parameters of immunity for government officials and government 
acts.  The introductory section of the Act declares: 
 
[We] ... recognize[] the inherently unfair 
and inequitable results which occur in the 
strict application of the traditional 
doctrine of sovereign immunity.  On the other 
hand [we] ... recognize[] that while a 
private entrepreneur may readily be held 
liable for negligence within the chosen ambit 
of his activity, the area within which 
government has the power to act for the 
public good is almost without limit and 
therefore government should not have the duty 
8 
to do everything that might be done. 
Consequently, it is hereby declared to be the 
public policy of this State that public 
entities shall only be liable for their 
negligence within the limitations of this act 
and in accordance with the fair and uniform 
principles established herein.  All of the 
provisions of this act should be construed 
with a view to carry out the above 
legislative declaration. 
N.J.S.A. 59:1-2. 
 As part of the Tort Claims Act, the New Jersey 
Legislature promulgated N.J.S.A. 59:4-8, which provides:  
[n]either a public entity nor a public 
employee is liable for an injury caused by a 
condition of any unimproved public property, 
including but not limited to any natural 
condition of any lake, stream, bay, river or 
beach.   
Both the comment to N.J.S.A. 59:4-8 and the New Jersey Supreme 
Court make clear that "the term unimproved public property should 
be liberally construed."  Troth v. State, 566 A.2d 515, 518 (N.J. 
1989); see also Comment to N.J.S.A. 59:4-8&9 ("it is intended ... 
that the term unimproved public property should be liberally 
construed").  Underlying these determinations is the New Jersey 
Legislature's policy judgment that the public should be permitted 
to use unimproved public property in its natural condition, but 
under the cloak of immunity.  Otherwise, the burdens and expenses 
of putting such property in safe condition as well as the expense 
of defending claims for injuries might cause public entities to 
close these areas to public use altogether.  See Troth, 566 A.2d 
at 519-20; Report of the Attorney General's Task Force on 
Sovereign Immunity (May 1972). 
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 In its clearest statement of the standard guiding a 
determination of whether property remains "unimproved" under 
N.J.S.A. 59:4-8, the New Jersey Supreme Court explained "[p]ublic 
property is no longer 'unimproved' when there has been 
substantial physical modification of the property from its 
natural state, and when the physical change creates hazards that 
did not previously exist and that require management by the 
public entity."  Troth, 566 A.2d at 521. 
A. 
 Our starting point for determining whether the 
properties at issue here remain "unimproved" is to identify the 
relevant properties.  In Troth, the plaintiff's injury occurred 
after falling over a spillway in a boat on Union Lake, which lies 
at the southern tip of a wildlife-management area belonging to 
New Jersey.  The lake was created by a dam built in the 
nineteenth century, which allows excess water to flow over a 
spillway into an adjacent river.  The plaintiff in Troth alleged 
the conditions created by the dam and the spillway resulted in 
water flow rates dangerous to boats, and that these conditions 
caused the accident.  The state contended the lake was unimproved 
public property and therefore the state was immune from 
liability.  After concluding that public property can be partly 
improved and partly unimproved, the Troth court found the dam and 
spillway were "improved."  Troth, 566 A.2d at 522.  Because the 
accident occurred in the spillway, which was improved property, 
N.J.S.A. 59:4-8 immunity did not apply.  Significantly for our 
purposes, the New Jersey Supreme Court stated its finding would 
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not foreclose application of 59:4-8 immunity to the lake itself, 
which remained unimproved property.  Id. at 523. 
 The parties here do not identify the relevant 
properties for purposes of assessing N.J.S.A. 59:4-8 immunity. 
Nevertheless, it is our view that the beach, or more 
particularly, the water (and beach below) in which each plaintiff 
was swimming while injured is the relevant property.  As Troth 
illustrates, we should not look at the entire general area where 
the injury occurred.  Just as a dam and spillway may be 
distinguished from an adjoining lake in some circumstances, in 
these instances, the surf and sand below it where the accidents 
took place should be distinguished from the entire coastline, the 
beaches themselves, or structures on the beaches. 
B. 
 To rebut defendants' assertion of immunity, Kowalsky 
set out to prove that the property was improved.0  He submitted a 
report prepared by an expert on beaches, which chronicled "beach 
nourishment/modification" projects and the placement of 
"permanent shore protection structures," such as stone jetties, 
along the beaches of the region where the accident occurred.  The 
thrust of the report was that the beaches of the area "[did] not 
constitute a natural system" and that the beach configuration on 
                     
0In considering the application of N.J.S.A. 59:4-8 immunity, 
under New Jersey case law, at trial "the burden is on ... [a] 
public entity both to plead and prove its immunity under" the 
Tort Claims Act.  Kolitch v. Lindedahl, 497 A.2d 183, 189 (N.J. 
1985); see also Bligen v. Jersey City Hous. Auth., 619 A.2d 575 
(N.J. 1993).   
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the day of Kowalsky's injury "would not have been possible 
without substantial man-made modifications to the natural 
system."  Appellant's Appendix at 117.   
 Yet Kowalsky's expert presented no evidence about Spray 
Beach specifically, let alone the site of the injury or the 
immediate surrounding area.  Furthermore, human modifications do 
not necessarily result in "improved" property under N.J.S.A. 
59:4-8.  In Troth the New Jersey Supreme Court rejected the Law 
Division's view that the Tort Claims Act only confers immunity 
when an injury is caused by a natural condition of any unimproved 
property.  Troth, 566 A.2d at 520-21.  In so doing, the court 
made clear that finding something is artificial--not natural--
does not necessarily make the property improved. 
 Whether property is improved turns on whether there has 
been a substantial physical modification from its natural state, 
and whether the physical changes create a hazard that did not 
previously exist and which requires management by the public 
entity.  Troth, 566 A.2d at 521.  In addition, there must be a 
causal link between the physical change to the property and the 
injury.  Id. ("Obviously, in order for liability to be imposed on 
the public entity there must be a causal connection between the 
'improvement' and the alleged injury."). 
 Under the Troth standard, the property relevant to 
Kowalsky's claim remained unimproved.  First, there was no 
evidence that the situs or immediate area of the accident was 
modified, substantially or otherwise.  Second, there was no 
evidence that the modifications closest to the site of the 
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accident, such as the stone jetties built offshore at places 
around Long Beach Island, constituted substantial physical 
changes and created hazards that did not previously exist and 
which warranted maintenance by municipal authorities.  Finally, 
there was no evidence of a causal relationship between any 
purported changes to the surrounding area and the injury Kowalsky 
suffered. 
 In sum, looking at all the evidence Kowalsky presented, 
a reasonable jury could not find that his accident occurred on 
property which is "improved" under N.J.S.A. 59:4-8.  There is no 
genuine issue of material fact in dispute.  In different 
circumstances other New Jersey courts have applied 59:4-8 
immunity on summary judgment.  See, e.g., Troth, 566 A.2d 515; 
Bany v. Borough of Haworth, 632 A.2d 535 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 1993), certification denied, 639 A.2d 301 (N.J. 1994) 
(reversing trial court grant of immunity under N.J.S.A. 59:4-8, 
finding tree causing injury upon falling from public tract of 
land was a "condition of improved property"); Freitag v. Morris 
County, 426 A.2d 75 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1981) (clearing a 
sledding hill once did not render it improved property).  We 
agree with the district court that the property here was 
"unimproved," and that the immunity provision in N.J.S.A. 59:4-8 
applies. 
C. 
 In a similar effort to show the property where his 
accident occurred was improved, Petrillo presented an expert's 
view that "the beach at Surf City has been maintained by ongoing 
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coastal engineering efforts that have included beach nourishment 
projects and the construction of groin structures."  Appendix 
Vol. II at 401.  The expert also claimed that "coastal structures 
induce water motions and beach characteristics that differ 
substantially from those found on natural or undisturbed 
beaches."  Id.  
 But the expert did not offer any evidence of "water 
motions" or "beach characteristics" at the site of the injury or 
the immediate surrounding area.  Furthermore, as we explained, 
human modifications do not necessarily result in "improved" 
property under N.J.S.A. 59:4-8.  Like the district court we see 
no evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that 
Petrillo's accident occurred on property which is "improved." 
There was no evidence that the situs or immediate area of the 
accident was modified, substantially or otherwise.  There was no 
evidence of substantial physical changes, even in the surrounding 
area, which created hazards that did not previously exist and 
which warranted maintenance by municipal authorities.  Nor was 
there evidence of a causal relationship between any purported 
changes to the surrounding area and Petrillo's injury.  Because 
there is no genuine issue of material fact that the property in 
question is unimproved, N.J.S.A. 59:4-8 immunizes defendants from 
these claims.0       
                     
0N.J.S.A. 59:4-8 is identical to an immunity statute previously 
adopted by California.  See Cal. Gov. Code § 831.2 (West 1995).  
Interpreting the identical provision, California courts have 
found "[i]t is now generally well settled that human-altered 
conditions, especially those that have existed for some years, 
which merely duplicate models common to nature are still 'natural 
14 
D. 
 The tragic facts are that the injuries to Roman 
Kowalsky and Gary Petrillo were caused by ocean waves--acts of 
nature, which are a "natural" condition of unimproved public 
property.  As one New Jersey court explained in another case 
involving a swimmer injured in the surf, "[t]here can be no 
liability on the part of ... [a] municipality for injuries caused 
exclusively by the action of the ocean."  Stempkowski v. Borough 
of Manasquan, 506 A.2d 5, 7-8 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986).   
IV. 
 The question remains whether N.J.S.A. 59:4-8 immunity 
precludes all causes of action arising from plaintiffs' injuries, 
including causes of action for negligent supervision and failure 
to warn.0  Kowalsky and Petrillo generally contend defendants 
                                                                  
conditions' as a matter of law for the purposes of ... [§ 831.2 
immunity]."  Tessier v. City of Newport Beach, 268 Cal. Rptr. 
233, 235 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990); see also Knight v. City of 
Capitola, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 874, 879-80 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).        
0In their complaints, Kowalsky and Petrillo each alleged 
defendants were liable under a "dangerous condition" cause of 
action.  N.J.S.A. 59:4-2 provides: 
 
  A public entity is liable for injury caused 
by a condition of its property if the 
plaintiff establishes that the property was 
in dangerous condition at the time of the 
injury, that the injury was proximately 
caused by the dangerous condition, that the 
dangerous condition created a reasonably 
foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which 
was incurred, and that either: 
  a. a negligent or wrongful act or omission 
of an employee of the public entity within 
the scope of his employment created the 
dangerous condition; or 
  b. a public entity had actual or 
constructive notice of the dangerous 
15 
assumed responsibility for the safety of the beaches and were 
aware the weather created dangerous surf conditions, but 
nevertheless failed to take action to prevent their accidents. 
They also argue that as a matter of law N.J.S.A. 59:3-11 
abrogates any grant of immunity which might be conferred by 
N.J.S.A. 59:4-8.  We cannot agree.  Section 3-11 provides:  
 
[a] public employee is not liable for the 
failure to provide supervision of public 
recreational facilities.  Nothing in this 
section exonerates a public employee for 
negligence in the supervision of a public 
recreational facility. (emphasis added). 
The second sentence of N.J.S.A. 59:3-11 neither creates 
liability, nor provides defenses or immunities, for negligent 
supervision.  This is left to other statutory provisions like 
N.J.S.A. 59:4-8, which provides immunity for both public entities 
and public employees from claims arising from "injur[ies] caused 
by a condition of any unimproved public property."  It is well-
established that supervision, once undertaken, must be conducted 
in a non-negligent manner.  See Dudley v. Victor Lynn Lines, 
                                                                  
condition under section 59:4-3 a sufficient 
time prior to the injury to have taken 
measures to protect against the dangerous 
condition. 
  Nothing in this section shall be construed 
to impose liability upon a public entity for 
a dangerous condition of its public property 
if the action the entity took to protect 
against the condition or the failure to take 
such action was not palpably unreasonable. 
 
N.J.S.A. 59:4-2.  On appeal Petrillo does not challenge the 
district court's finding that his "dangerous condition" claim was 
barred by N.J.S.A. 59:4-8.  Brief for Appellant at 16. Similarly, 
in his brief Kowalsky did not raise this issue on appeal.   
16 
Inc., 161 A.2d 479, 488 (N.J. 1960); see also Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 323 (discussing negligent performance after 
undertaking to render services).  But the express language of 
N.J.S.A. 59:4-8 and the policy judgments underlying it 
demonstrate that immunity may still apply in the face of 
negligence.  Once it has been determined that N.J.S.A. 59:4-8 
immunity applies, the New Jersey Tort Claims Act makes clear that 
"[a]ny liability of a public entity established by this act is 
subject to any immunity of the public entity."  N.J.S.A. 59:2-
1b.0 
 Significantly, our understanding of the relationship 
between N.J.S.A. 59:3-11 and N.J.S.A. 59:4-8 is reinforced by the 
view of the New Jersey Supreme Court that "[w]hen both liability 
and immunity appear to exist, the latter trumps the former." Tice 
v. Cramer, 627 A.2d 1090, 1095 (N.J. 1993) (setting out the 
general principles of the Act and applying them to find that a 
police officer enjoys absolute immunity under N.J.S.A. 59:5-
2b(2), absent willful misconduct, for injuries to bystander 
arising from pursuit of fleeing vehicle); see also id. at 1102 
("Under no circumstances, however, may ... [liabilities of public 
employees], whatever their origin, trump the immunities provided 
for in the Act.  Where inconsistent, the liabilities fall, the 
immunities stand.").  Any possible liability allowed under 
N.J.S.A. 59:3-11 must be subordinate to immunity conferred by 
                     
0The same principle, that liability is subordinate to immunity, 
applies to public employees.  N.J.S.A. 59:3-1b provides in part: 
"[t]he liability of a public employee established by this act is 
subject to any immunity of a public employee provided by law." 
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N.J.S.A. 59:4-8.  To "rule otherwise would be to ignore what is 
probably the clearest and most important command of the Act, 
namely, that the immunities set forth in the Act prevail over any 
liabilities, whether found in the Act or in preexisting law, 
including statutes."  Id. at 1103.   
 In addition, notwithstanding that the Tort Claims Act 
is less sweeping in immunizing public employees than public 
entities, see generally Chatman v. Hall, 608 A.2d 263 (N.J. 1992) 
(discussing the differential treatment of public employees and 
entities by the Act), N.J.S.A. 59:4-8 makes clear that public 
entities and employees share the same immunity status with regard 
to "unimproved" property. 
 In the face of these principles, plaintiffs' reliance 
on certain New Jersey cases to support the view that N.J.S.A. 
59:3-11 abrogates N.J.S.A. 59:4-8 is unwarranted.  While New 
Jersey courts have yet to address the specific question whether 
negligent supervision claims survive application of N.J.S.A. 
59:4-8 immunity, the decisions refraining from answering this 
question on the basis of procedural and other grounds do not 
constitute a holding that immunity is abrogated.  See, e.g., 
Troth, 566 A.2d at 523 (deeming a negligent supervision claim 
inappropriate for summary disposition because it "was not alleged 
in the complaint and was only tangentially developed in the 
abbreviated record" before the court); Stempkowski, 506 A.2d 5, 
7-8 (1986) (holding that natural ocean action was not a 
"dangerous condition" and therefore failing to reach the question 
of how immunity claims are related to N.J.S.A. 59:3-11).   
18 
 Plaintiffs cite certain language in Troth to support 
their view that a negligent supervision claim is not barred by 
N.J.S.A. 59:4-8 immunity, and that once a public entity assumes 
supervision, it must be exercised with due care.  The New Jersey 
Supreme Court stated in Troth: 
[t]he controlling principle is that a public 
entity is not liable for the failure to 
supervise, but only for negligent 
supervision.  Consequently, a public employee 
does not lose immunity without some employee 
conduct, no matter how minute, evidencing an 
intent to supervise.  
 
Troth, 566 A.2d at 523.  But plaintiffs misinterpret the 
significance of this statement.  In Troth the accident occurred 
in the dam's spillway which was "improved" property.  The cited 
language refers to a negligent supervision claim arising from an 
injury sustained on "improved" property and therefore is 
inapposite.  Because the injuries here took place on "unimproved" 
property, N.J.S.A. 59:4-8 immunity applies.0 
                     
0Citing N.J.S.A. 59:2-2a, plaintiffs contend a public entity is 
liable for an employee's negligent supervision. 
 
A public entity is liable for injury 
proximately caused by an act or omission of a 
public employee within the scope of his 
employment in the same manner and to the same 
extent as a private individual under like 
circumstances. 
 
N.J.S.A. 59:2-2a.  While a public entity can be liable for an 
employee's negligence, N.J.S.A. 59:2-2a cannot abrogate N.J.S.A. 
59:4-8 immunity.  Section 59:2-2b provides: "[a] public entity is 
not liable for an injury resulting from an act or omission of a 
public employee where the public employee is not liable."  If the 
public employee defendants here are not liable, neither are the 
municipalities.      
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 We believe that the Tort Claims Act itself, coupled 
with the guidance offered in Tice, make evident that a negligent 
supervision claim of the character advanced here is also subject 
to the statutory immunity conferred by N.J.S.A. 59:4-8. 
V.  
 Finally, defendants maintain that they are immunized 
from any liability in this case by N.J.S.A. 59:3-2 and 59:2-3, 
which confer immunity to public entities for the exercise of 
judgment or discretion under certain circumstances.  Given our 
disposition of the immunity claims presented here, we need not  
examine this issue. 
VI. 
 For the foregoing reasons we will affirm the district 
court's grants of summary judgment in favor of all defendants. 
 
                         
 
